

RECORDS CODE SHEET
5ND 4535 (Rev. 1/65)

NAVAL AVIATION SAFETY CENTER

GENERAL (Card No. 1)

SUPPLEMENTARY (Card No. 2)

GENERAL (Card No. 1)				SUPPLEMENTARY (Card No. 2)			
Bureau Number	142685	16-21	Weather				16-21
Reporting Custodian	729	22-24	Kind of Flight			1K1	22-24
Type Duty	L	25	Relative Wind - Direction			5	25
Major Command	7	26	Relative Wind - Velocity			2	26
Aircraft Damage	A	27	Special Attention				27
Aircraft Injury	F	28	Clearance			2	28
Time of Day	2	29	Maneuver prior to Occurrence			N	29
Carrier Hull Number		30	Number of other Aircraft				30
First Accident type	C1	31-32	Primary Causal Factor			P7	31-32
First Accident phase	31	33-35	Altitude of Occurrence or Emergency				33-35
Second Accident type	C3	36-37					
Second Accident phase	A1	38-40	Environmental Factors			HA	38-40
Type of Operation	3	41-42					
Contributing Cause Factors	1	43-47	Non-Navy Injury ("R")				42
Pilot Factor, First	IP P7	48-49	Number of "A" or "U" Injury				43-44
Pilot Factor, Second	PAC	50-51	Number of "B" Injury				46-47
Pilot Factor, Third	XY	52-53	Number of "C" Injury				48-49
First other Personnel Factor		54-55	Number of "D" Injury				50-51
Second other Personnel Factor		56-57	Number of "E" Injury				52-53
Primary Major Material Factor		58	Number of "F" Injury			P1	54-55
Secondary Major Material Factor		59	Number of "G" Injury				56-57
Design		60	Location			A1 L H H S T	62-68
Facilities		61					
Special Data & Cond. <i>NAORS Chg.</i>	MB	62-65					
Special Data & Cond./Type of Incident		66					
Primary Cause	1	67	ACCIDENT DAMAGE	A			
1st Posit. of Pri. Causal Factor	P	68	ACCIDENT INJURY	F			
1st Possible Cause & Causal Factor		69-71	FISCAL YEAR	6			
2nd Possible Cause & Causal Factor		72-74					
No Personnel Card ("R")		80					

PERSONNEL STATISTICS
(Card No. 3)

PERSONNEL STATISTICS (Card No. 3)		Rank/Rate	Br Service	Age	Yrs Experience	Status	Position	Int to Ind	Abandon A/C	Pilot Factor Involved	Trainer Utilization	Instr. Card	Total Time All Models	All Models 3 Months	All Series This Model	All Ser Mod 3 Months	CY Landings	Instrument Hours	Nite Hours	Total Time Jet or Helo
File Number →	(b) (6)																			
Name	(b) (6)	16	17	18	19	20	21													
03	(b) (6)																			
		22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	35	37	40	42	45	47	49	51
04																				
Name		16	17	18	19	20	21													
File Number →																				

IBM: PERSONNEL CODED ON REVERSE SIDE ☐

IBM: PERSONNEL CODED ON REVERSE SIDE ☐

CODED 9/10 REVIEWED AD LOGGED vgm PUNCHED WI VERIFIED V

CODE SHEET REVIEWED BY CLASS DESK ANALYST

(Initials)

29 OCT 1965
(Date)

(Date _____)

A & R DEPARTMENT NARRATIVE CODE SHEET SMD 5293 (New 11/64)

YEAR	MONTH	DAY	TYPE	NUMBER	DAMAGE	INJURY	MODEL
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12	13	14	15	
5	8	3	1	1	6	2	AFN44B

BUREAU NUMBER

142685

7	5	7	6	7	7	9
6	0	4				

16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70															
COLL GND CONT. OVERRUN RWY ON T/O. ACFT ATTEMPTED NORM																																																																					

NARRATIVE BRIEF

16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70															
DAY T/O ON 5M FT USEABLE RWY. DUE TO GROSS WT & DENSITY																																																																					
ALT CONDIT ACFT UNABLE TO OBTAIN LIFT OFF SPD PRIOR TO																																																																					
REACHING UPWIND END. PLT ATTEMPTED TO PULL ACFT OFF &																																																																					
IN DOING SO BECAME AIRBORNE AFTER LEAVING RWY LIP. ACFT																																																																					
CONTINUED IN NOSE HIGH ATTITUDE ACROSS 2 ROADS, FENCE &																																																																					
A DITCH BEFORE CRASHING IN SWAMPY AREA. PICKED UP BY																																																																					
HELO. PLT. IMPROPER PREFLT GROSS WT OF ACFT, ACCEPTED																																																																					
RWY TOO SHORT FOR WT OF ACFT. THE ACFT HAD 6.5M LBS OF																																																																					
WATER IN EXTERNAL TANKS AS INDICATED ON YELLOW SHEET.																																																																					

29 OCT 1965

REPAIRED BY

C/HB

PUNCHED

VERIFIED

U. S. NAVAL AVIATION SAFETY CENTER
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA 23511

NASC/dy
Ser 112/ 1785
17 November 1965

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IAW OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

From: Commander, U. S. Naval Aviation Safety Center
To: Commanding Officer, U. S. Naval Air Test Facility (Ship
Installations), U. S. Naval Air Station, Lakehurst, New Jersey

Subj: NAVAIRTESTFAC(SI) LAKEHURST AAR ser 1-65A concerning NA-4B BuNo
142685 accident occurring 31 August 1965, pilot (b)

1. The subject report and all endorsements thereon have been reviewed.
The Naval Aviation Safety Center concurs with the comments and
recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board as modified by subsequent
endorsements.

2. The cause of this accident has been recorded by the Center indicating
the PILOT (incomplete pre-flight inspection) as the single cause factor.

(b) (6)

By direction

Copy to:
BUWERS (ESA) (2)
COMNAVAIRTESTCEN
CO NAS LAKEHURST
BUWERSREP LONG BEACH

NWSA
FSA-3:WHH
4 November 1965

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66, OPNAVINST
P3750.6E

FOURTH ENDORSEMENT on NATF(SI), serial 1-65, concerning NA4B BUNO 142685,
accident occurring 31 August 1965, pilot (b) (6)

From: Chief, Bureau of Naval Weapons
To: Commander, U. S. Naval Aviation Safety Center

Subj: Aircraft Accident

Ref: (a) NAVWEPS 01-40AOA-1 NATOPS Flight Manual A4A/B

1. Forwarded, concurring in the comments and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board and as modified by subsequent endorsements except as noted below.

2. The Bureau does not concur that a change to the NATOPS Manual is required. Section III, Part I, page 3-3, Item number 3 of reference (a) specifies the following "The briefing guide will include the following items, when applicable:

3. Fuel load, stores and aircraft gross weight."

Compliance with the foregoing could have prevented this accident.

(b) (6)

By direction

Copy to:
NATC PAX RIVER
CO, NAS LAKEHURST
CO, NATF(SI)



ORIGINAL

NA4B

FT2211-440

OCT 27 1965

THIRD ENDORSEMENT on NATF(SI), serial 1-65, concerning NA4B
BuNo 142685, accident occurring 31 August 1965, Pilot (b) (6)

From: Commander, Naval Air Test Center
To: Commander, Naval Aviation Safety Center
Via: Chief, Bureau of Naval Weapons

Subj: NATF(SI) Aircraft Accident Report 1-65

1. Forwarded, concurring with the conclusions of the Board.
2. Pilots of this command are continually briefed regarding the necessity for thorough familiarization with an aircraft prior to conducting a test project. LT (b) (6) is qualified in the A4B in all respects and his professionalism in test work is highly regarded.

D. F. Smith, Jr.
D. F. SMITH, JR.

Copy to:
NAVAVNSAFECEN (2)
BUWEPSREP, Long Beach
CO, NATF(SI)
CO, NAS, Lakehurst

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66,
OPNAVINST 3750.6E

ORIGINAL

ORIGINAL

Code AD

RHK:pp

Serial: 3087

29 SEP 1965

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 66, OPNAV INST 3750.6E

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on NATF(SI), serial 1-65, concerning NA4B, BJNO 142685, accident occurring 31 August 1965, Pilot (b) (6)

From: Commanding Officer, U. S. Naval Air Station, Lakehurst, N. J.
To: Commander, Naval Aviation Safety Center, Norfolk, Virginia
Via: (1) Commanding Officer, U. S. Naval Air Test Center, Patuxent River, Maryland
(2) Chief, Bureau of Naval Weapons

Subj: NATF(SI) Aircraft Accident Report 1-65

1. Forwarded.

2. The Naval Air Station, Lakehurst has the standard complement of crash and rescue vehicles, including a four-wheel drive, high chassis, forcible entry truck with an Ansul Chemical Firefighting Unit attached, which is capable of traversing most of the terrain, except wooded areas. Surrounding terrain at Lakehurst consists of a very loose sandy soil, areas heavily wooded with pine trees, and swampy areas also heavily wooded. The Army LARC Vehicle would not increase our capability, inasmuch as the swampy and wooded terrain require a bulldozer and prepared roadbed for access. To improve our crash firefighting capability, a single vehicle is needed which will penetrate 12-inch diameter trees within a marsh and be able to put out fires with its own attached equipment.

3. The ditch approximately 500 feet from the end of the runway will be graded and leveled so as not to be an additional hazard to aircraft.


H. W. DRUM

Copy to:
BUWPS (Advance)
NAVAVNSAFECEN (2) (Advance)
BUWPSREPLONGBEACH
CO, NATF(SI)
CO, NATC (Advance)

ORIGINAL

80-JCL:mg
SEP 21 1965

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on NATF(SI) AAR 1-65 dtd 31 Aug 1965 NA4B BUNO 142685
Pilot BULL

From: Commanding Officer, U. S. Naval Air Test Facility (Ship Installations)
U. S. Naval Air Station, Lakehurst, N. J.
To: Commander, Naval Aviation Safety Center, Norfolk, Virginia
VIA: (1) Commanding Officer, U. S. Naval Air Station, Lakehurst, N.J.
(2) Commanding Officer, U. S. Naval Air Test Center, Patuxent
River, Maryland
(3) Chief, Bureau of Naval Weapons

Subj: U. S. Naval Air Test Facility (SI) Aircraft Accident Report 1-65
of 31 August 1965, NA4B BUNO 142685, Pilot (b) (6)

1. Forwarded.

2. I concur with the conclusions reached by the Aircraft Accident Board in that the accident was caused primarily by pilot complacency, predetermined thoughts, preoccupied thoughts or a combination thereof. Despite this apparent pilot error, it should be stated that LT (b) (6) has repeatedly demonstrated high pilot proficiency at this Test Facility in a variety of aircraft. His excellent professionalism is known and recognized.

3. Comments on the Aircraft Accident Board's recommendations are as follows:

a. It is concurred that all pilots must be constantly reminded of the importance of conducting conscientious and thorough pre-flight procedures. The tendency for competent pilots to become complacent must be continuously curbed. LT (b) (6) was fortunate to emerge from this accident unscathed and will probably never relax his vigilance again. Other pilots cannot always count on luck to rescue them from situations caused by complacency.

b. It is concurred that all pilots be mentally prepared for unusual emergency situations. In that LT (b) (6) was apparently completely oblivious to the fact that his aircraft was very heavy, his failure to jettison the external stores is understood. However, it would seem that jettison action of any weight, however small, should be SOP for situations wherein the aircraft fails to lift off or climb and abort action is no longer possible.

"SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66, OPNAVINST 3750.6E"

00: JCL:mc
SEP 21 1965

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on NATF(SI) AAR 1-65 dtd 31 Aug 1965 NA4B BUNO 142685
Pilot (b) (6)

c. It is concurred that the plane captain responsible for the actual servicing of the aircraft be on hand during the pilot's pre-flight, only, if practicable. This procedure is normal practice for this Command. There are occasions, however, when the regular plane captain cannot be present during the pilot's inspection. The pilot should be made aware of this fact, as he was in this incident, and should exert extra vigilance during his pre-flight inspections.

d. It is concurred that the NATOPS procedures for the A4 be modified to require visual inspections of external stores for presence of liquids. This is the normal procedure in this Command. Cockpit placards will be used to indicate contents of external stores in the future.

e. It is concurred that the Naval Air Station, Lakehurst, be provided with crash and rescue vehicles capable of penetrating the terrain of the station and surrounding area. This accident was fortunate in that no disabling injury occurred to the pilot or that no fire started at the aircraft. If such had not been the case, a tragedy could have been the result of non-availability of crash and rescue equipment capable of coping with existing terrain of the Air Station.

f. It is concurred that the ditch located in the overrun area be filled. Such fill would not have prevented or reduced the damage of this accident, but could be of benefit in the event aircraft run off the runway in the future.

4. LT (b) was involved in one previous accident. In 1960 he successfully ditched a F3H Demon when flameout occurred immediately after receiving a catapult shot. He was assessed Zero (0) pilot error. Enclosure (17) outlines the pilot's wide experience and is indicative of his versatility. His pilot ability at this activity has always been excellent.

5. All pilots of this Command have been reinstructed to exercise extra caution in conducting pre-flight inspections of the aircraft. They have also been reinstructed to become completely aware of aircraft limitations as concerns weight, take-off distance and take-off speed. As has been mentioned previously, cockpit placards will be used to indicate external loadings.


JAMES C. LIEBER

Copy to:
BUWEPSREPLONGBEACH

INDEX RIGHT SIDE

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"SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66, OPNAVINST 3750.6E".

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

OPNAV FORM 3750-1A (Rev. 3-63) Page 1

ORIGINAL

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in chain of command with
Para. 66, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6, effective edition

OPNAV REPORT 3750-1

PART 1 GENERAL

1. AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT BOARD APPOINTED BY NATF(SI)	2. SERIAL NO. 1-65A	3. DTG (LOCAL) OF MISHAP 311407Z AUG.	4. MODEL AIRCRAFT NA43	5. BUREAU NUMBER 142685
6. TO: Commander, Naval Aviation Safety Center	9. LOCATION OF MISHAP NAS Lakehurst, N. J.	10. DAMAGE ALFA		
7. VIA (1) CO, NATF(SI) NAS Lkhst NJ*	11. TIME OF DAY 1407Z	12. TIME IN FLIGHT 0400	13. FLIGHT CODE 1K1	
(2) CO, NAS Lakehurst, N. J.	14. CLEARED FROM: NAS Lakehurst, TO: NAS Patuxent River			
(3) CO, NATC, NAS Patuxent River, Maryland	15. TYPE CLEARANCE VFR	16. AIRSPEED 150 P.	17. A/C WEIGHT 22,100	
(4) BUWEPs	19. ELEVATION AT TIME OF MISHAP S.L. 102' TERRAIN 0'			
18. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MISHAP Aircraft over-ran runway on take-off				
20. LIST MODEL, BUNO, REPORTING CUSTODIAN AND DAMAGE CLASSIFICATION OF ANY OTHER A/C INVOLVED (Complete OPNAV Form 3750-1 for each A/C)				

SECTION A. IDENTIFICATION

SECTION B. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

✓	FACTOR	✓	FACTOR	✓	FACTOR
	1. PILOT ERROR IN TECHNIQUE/JUDGMENT		9. SERVICING PERSONNEL		17. WEATHER
	2. PILOT DEVIATION FROM NATOPS PROCEDURES		10. LANDING SIGNAL OFFICER		18. DESIGN AIRCRAFT
	3. PILOT INCORRECT OPERATION OF A/C SYSTEM		11. OTHER PERSONNEL (Specify)		19. DESIGN CREW EQUIPMENT
X	4. PILOT OTHER (Specify) Improper Pilot Error, Preflight		12. ADMINISTRATIVE		20. DESIGN OTHER (Specify)
	5. CREW		13. FACILITIES-RUNWAY, OVERRUN TAXIWAY, FLIGHT DECK		21. ROLLING/PITCHING DECK ROUGH SEAS
	6. MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL		14. FACILITIES-NAV AIDS, LANDING AIDS (CCA, CCA, ILS, MISKORD)		22. MATERIAL FAILURE/MALFUNCTION
X	7. MAINTENANCE SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL		15. FACILITIES-CATAPULT, ARRESTING GEAR (Ship or field)		23. UNDETERMINED
	8. SUPERVISORY OTHER (Specify)		16. FACILITIES OTHER (Specify)		24. OTHER (Specify)

1. NAME (Last, first, & middle initial) PILOT (at controls at time of mishap) (b) (6)	2. RANK/ GRADE LT	3. A/C SERVICE NO. (b) (6)	4. DESIG. PREFIX 1310	5. BRANCH OF SERVICE USH	6. AGE 30	7. YEARS SUP. COA 6	8. BULLET Test Pilot	9. POSITION Pilot	10. PILOT CODE G
CO-PILOT (Identify & submit separate page 1)									

SECTION C. PERSONNEL DATA

ITEM			ITEM		
11. ALL MODELS	1708		17. CV LANDINGS DAY/NIGHT	ALL	322 / 60
12. ALL MODELS IN LAST 12 MONTHS	328		18. FCLP LANDINGS LAST 6 MONTHS DAY/NIGHT	IN MODEL	0 / 0
13. ALL MODELS IN LAST 3 MONTHS	45		19. INSTRUMENT HOURS LAST 3 MONTHS ACTUAL/SIMULATED	ALL	78 / 0
14. ALL SERIES THIS MODEL	A/C	28	20. NIGHT HOURS LAST 3 MONTHS	IN MODEL	1 / 0
	OFT/CPT	NA / NA		ALL	0 / 0
15. ALL SERIES THIS MODEL LAST 12 MONTHS	A/C	27	21. TOTAL HOURS IN JETS (if jet mishap) HELOS (if helo mishap)	DATE	10 Aug. 1965
	OFT/CPT	NA / NA		DURATION	.5
16. ALL SERIES THIS MODEL LAST 3 MONTHS	A/C	3	22. LAST PRIOR FLIGHT ALL SERIES THIS MODEL		
	OFT/CPT	NA / NA	24. TYPE INSTRUMENT CARD	STAN	
23. DATE/GRADE LAST NATOPS STANDARDIZATION CHECK	NATOPS Waiver 24Jun65				

25. NAME (Last, first, & middle initial)	26. DATA	27. BRANCH OF SERVICE	28. FILE/ SOURCE NO.	29. UNIT	30. BRANCH	31. BULLET	32. POSITION

-1-

ORIGINAL

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

OPNAV FORM 3750-1A (Rev. 3-63) Page 2

ORIGINAL

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

OPNAV REPORT 3750-1

Para. 66, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 5070.6, eff. 1-1-64

PART II: MAINTENANCE, MATERIAL AND FACILITIES DATA

1. DATE OF MANUFACTURE	2. FLIGHT HRS. SINCE ACCEPTANCE	3. NO. OF PAR/OVERHAUL	4. MONTHS SINCE LAST PAR/OVERHAUL	5. FLT. HRS. SINCE LAST PAR/OVERHAUL	6. LAST PAR/OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	7. TYPE OF LAST CHECK PERFORMED	8. FLIGHT HOURS SINCE LAST CHECK	9. DAYS SINCE LAST CHECK

1. ENGINE MODEL	2. ENGINE SERIAL NUMBER	3. FLIGHT HRS. SINCE ACCEPTANCE	4. NUMBER OF OVERHAULS	5. WAS DIR. REQUESTED?	6. FLT. HRS. SINCE LAST OVERHAUL	7. LAST OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	8. TYPE OF LAST CHECK PERFORMED	9. FLIGHT HOURS SINCE LAST CHECK	10. DAYS SINCE LAST CHECK
(1)									
(2)									
(3)									
(4)									

1. COMPONENT INVOLVED NOMENCLATURE	2. MANUFACTURER'S PART NUMBER	3. TOTAL HRS. ON PART	4. NO. OF OY-HAULS	5. HOURS SINCE LAST OVERHAUL	6. OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	7. WAS DIR. REQUESTED?	8. SER. NO. FLIR/AMPUR
(1)							
(2)							
(3)							
(4)							

1. PARTS REPAIRED		3. DIRECT MANHOURS INVOLVED	2. PARTS REPLACED	
PART NUMBER	NOMENCLATURE		PART NUMBER	NOMENCLATURE

JET ENGINE FLAMEOUT (Include intentional securing to prevent engine damage)							
AT TIME OF FLAMEOUT	1. ALTITUDE	2. IAS	3. RPM	4. EGT	5. MANEUVER AT TIME OF FLAMEOUT	6. FUEL FLOW	7. ATTITUDE
8. G FORCES	9. RELIGHT <input type="checkbox"/> ATTEMPTED <input type="checkbox"/> ACCOMPLISHED		10. ALTITUDE	11. IAS	12. MAX EGT	13. FUEL CONTROL <input type="checkbox"/> PRIMARY <input type="checkbox"/> MANUAL	14. NO. RELIGHT ATTEMPTS
INTENTIONAL SECURE	15. ENGINE SYMPTOMS			16. CAUSE OF SYMPTOMS			
RECIPROCATING ENGINE FAILURE							
17. ALTITUDE	18. IAS	19. ATTITUDE	20. RPM	21. MAP	22. TORQUE/GHP	23. FUEL FLOW PRESSURE	24. OIL PRESSURE
INTENTIONAL SECURE	25. ENGINE SYMPTOMS			26. CAUSE OF SYMPTOMS			

IDENTIFY OTHER REPORTS CONCERNING THIS MISHAP	
1. AMPFUR SERIAL NUMBER	
2. DIR MESSAGE REQUEST DATE-TIME-GROUP	None
3. OTHER	Preliminary MSG RPT 312118Z AUG.
4.	Supplementary MSG RPT 011939Z AUG.

ORIGINAL

OPNAV REPORT 3750-1

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

OPNAV FORM 3750-1A (Rev. 3-63) Page 3

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED *in accordance with*

Para. 66, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3500.6, effective 1 July 1963

1. EQUIPMENT INVOLVED <input type="checkbox"/> CATAPULT <input type="checkbox"/> ARRESTING GEAR		2. PRESSURE SETTING	3. WIND OVER DECK	4. RELATIVE WIND	5. APPROACH/END SPEED
6. MARK NUMBER	7. MODEL NUMBER	8. LOCATION OF SHIP		9. 12 INCHING BRIDLE AND BRIDLE ARRESTER	
10. CATAPULT/ARRESTING GEAR BULLETINS OR NOMOGRAMS USED					

10. CATAPULT/ARRESTING GEAR BULLETINS OR NOMOGRAMS USED

11. This portion shall be completed whenever (1) an aircraft accident involves arresting gear barrier and/or barricade equipment, or (2) an aircraft accident involves malfunctioning of arresting gear, barrier and/or barricade equipment. Incidents or routine damage to cables, weldings and other expendable equipment need not be reported herein.			15.	16.	COMMENTS
--	--	--	-----	-----	----------

ENGAGED	12. DECK RUNOUT (FEET)	13. RAM TRAVEL (INCHES)	14. CONTROL VALVE SETTINGS		15. ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE (PSI)	16. COMMENTS (for cable failures specify no. landings and months in service)
			CONSTANT PRESSURE			
			DCME (P.S.I.)	RATIO		
DECK PENDANT						
DECK PENDANT						
BARRIER/ BARRICADE						

FOR ACCIDENTS ABOARD CARRIERS (complete on pilot)

FOR ACCIDENTS ABOARD CARRIERS (complete on pilot)			
DEPLOYMENT	1. DATE DEPLOYED COMUS	3. DAY HOURS/LANDINGS SINCE DEPLOYMENT	4. DAY HOURS/LANDINGS LAST 30 DAYS
	2. NO. DAYS OPERATING PERIOD		
	5. INST. HOURS LOGGED SINCE DEPLOYMENT ACTUAL/SIMULATED	6. NIGHT HOURS/LANDINGS SINCE DEPLOYMENT	7. NIGHT HOURS/LANDINGS LAST 30 DAYS

WEATHER AT SCENE OF MISHAP

WEATHER AT SCENE OF DISASTER					
1. CEILING Unknown Broken	2. VISIBILITY 15	3. RELATIVE WIND DIRECTION AND VELOCITY 50° Wind 8 G 14	4. TEMPERATURE RUNWAY 77° OUTSIDE AIR 76.0°	5. DEW POINT 40°F	6. ALTIMETER SETTING 30.20
7. OTHER WEATHER CONDITIONS (include cloud, icing level, sea state, density altitude, as appropriate) Density Altitude + 900 Feet.					

PART III ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

PART III ADDITIONAL INFORMATION			
PART	SECTION	ITEM	REMARKS
		1	<p>2. COPY DISTRIBUTION</p> <p>200 NAVAVNSAFECN DIRECT (AAR)</p> <p>100 BUMEPS DIRECT (AAR)</p> <p>CO, DAT, REFLONG BEACH, NV</p> <p>CO, NASL</p> <p>REPLONG BEACH,</p> <p>(DIRECT)</p>
3. GOVERNMENT PROPERTY			4. PRIVATE PROPERTY
COST DAMAGE TO: NONE			NONE
			5. DATE SUBMITTED TO CO SEP 17 1965

PART IV SIGNATURES OF THE BOARD

PART IV SIGNATURES OF THE BOARD	
(b) (6)	(b) (6)
(b) (6) CDR., USN NATE(SI), Operations Officer	(b) (6) LT., USN NATE(SI), Safety Officer
(b) (6) LT., USN Flight Surgeon, NAS Lakehurst, N. J.	(b) (6) LT., USN NATE(SI), Maintenance Officer

* When preparing Incident and Ground Accident reports, items indicated by an asterisk in the upper right hand corner must be filled in. Other items considered appropriate should also be filled in.

Part V - The Accident

LT (b) was scheduled for a 1400 take-off from Lakehurst to deliver A4B, BuNo 142685 to NATC, Patuxent River for weight and balance. After filing his flight plan, and preflighting the aircraft, he taxied to the approach end of Runway #24, received take-off clearance, and commenced his take-off roll at 1407 local.

Because of conditions discussed in the investigation and analysis portion, (Part VII) of this report, the aircraft was unable to get airborne in the 5,000 feet of useable runway. The aircraft continued beyond the upwind end of the runway in an estimated 20-25 degree nose high attitude for 504 feet where it struck the far side of a 27 foot wide ditch with all three landing gear.

At this point, the aircraft bounced into the air to an approximate altitude of 5 to 10 feet (confirmed by height of trees clipped off in its flight path) and rotated to an even higher nose up attitude. It maintained this altitude and nose high attitude for another 406 feet where it struck the top strand of a four foot barbed wire fence (see Enclosure 2 and 4).

The flight path remained virtually the same for the next 275 feet with numerous pine trees of a 2 - 4 inch diameter being clipped off 6 - 8 feet above ground level.

The aircraft then changed flight path approximately 40° starboard and continued for 450 feet without tree contact (see Enclosure 2). This is probably due to terrain with a slight down gradient. Impact with the ground was made 520 feet from the surfaced asphalt road. The aircraft then slid for 330 feet before coming to rest in a slightly nose down attitude.

LT (b) (6) opened the canopy, climbed out of the cockpit, and secured the engine while standing alongside the aircraft. He then made his way from the aircraft and was picked up by an HC-Two Helo at 1415, (see Enclosures 1 - 11).

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Part VI - Damage to Aircraft

The aircraft received relatively minor damage as it traveled the 1,705 feet from the end of the runway to the impact point. It suffered strike damage as it struck the ground and skidded the 330 feet to its final resting place.

Small fragments of metal, three drop tank tail cones, a damaged barbed wire fence and numerous broken bushes and small pine trees were found in the aircraft's flight path up to the final impact point. The impact with the ground collapsed the three landing gear rear-ward and demolished the remains of the three drop tanks. The collective forces of the impact and 330 feet skid demolished the fuselage nose section, the underside of the fuselage, the leading edge and underside of the wing.

The engine received FOD damage from leaves, branches and debris.

The engine and accessories will be shipped to O&R Quonset Point for final disposition. The airframe will remain on board NAS Lakehurst, N. J. (See Enclosures 12 - 16).

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Part VII - Investigation and Analysis

The Safety Officer and Maintenance Officer were at the scene of the crash ten minutes after the mishap and the other members of AAR Board shortly thereafter. After ensuring that the pilot was uninjured, the accident investigation was commenced. From these findings, the Board considered the following facts worthy of discussion and analysis.

LT (b) (6) was anxious to get home because he had been TAD to NATF(SI) since 10 June 1965, spending only weekends at home. During this period, his wife gave birth to a premature child that was still hospitalized in an incubator at the time of the accident. However, since LT (b) (6) did not volunteer for the flight, but was requested to assist this command in delivering the aircraft, the Board does not feel that a classification of "get-homeitis" is necessarily warranted.

The fact that he had flown four different types of aircraft (F8, T2, T-28 and A4) in the preceding twenty-four hours would, regardless of experience and training, tend to lessen his ability to rapidly and accurately diagnose the unusual situation in the short period of time he had in covering the last 1,500' of runway. This same fact, coupled with pilot's demonstrated proficiency and recent experience in the RDT&E effort, lends itself to a probable complacency factor.

LT (b) (6) was not informed that the aircraft had been previously loaded for a heavy weight CE 1-3 catapult launch and, therefore, had 6,500 lbs. of water in the external tanks.

The regular plane captain was not on hand to send the aircraft out and the pilot was not advised that the replacement was a qualified A4B plane captain prior to being transferred to powerplants in March 1965. The man was familiar with NATOPS procedures, however, and standard signals were used.

The pilot failed to ascertain the exact gross weight of the aircraft prior to take-off. The preconceived idea that the external tanks would be empty and that the plane captain would not be familiar with the aircraft are probably the most significant factors in:

- (1) Not noticing the aircraft loading marked on the yellow sheet.
- (2) Not questioning the plane captain as to loading or aircraft conditions after preflight.
- (3) The typical thud of a fluid filled tank not registering.
- (4) Disregarding the feeling that the aircraft felt heavy while taxiing.
- (5) His failure to analyze the situation during take-off; i. e., the problem had nothing to do with excessive weight; therefore, the idea of jettisoning the tanks was not considered.

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Part VII - Investigation and Analysis cont.

LT (b) (6) decision to use the 5,000 foot runway at West Field appears valid in the light of his misconception of aircraft gross weight. It is standard procedure for this activity to use the 5,000 foot runway for take-off providing aircraft weight and density altitude indications ensure a safe operation. The actual ground roll (6,200 feet) and airspeed (156.5 knots) required for a 22,100 lb. take-off at a density altitude of plus 900 feet are depicted in Enclosures (19) and (20). These enclosures also verify the fact that had the pilot jettisoned the external tanks at the speed he obtained (almost 150 knots), he would have literally jumped into the air. Actual lift off airspeed for the aircraft without tanks was computed to be 123 knots.

The engine is being removed for transfer to an O&R Facility for salvage. No DIR request was made due to the lack of any factual evidence indicating an engine malfunction. The aircraft was returned from PAR on 6 May 1965 and since that time has flown 55 hours. The last eighteen sorties were accomplished without an aircraft discrepancy with the last thirty plus sorties being flown without an engine discrepancy. The last engine discrepancy, a gauge malfunction, was reported on 2 August 1965. The engine indications reported by the pilot and the distance traveled during the mishap also verifies the opinion of the Board that the engine was developing maximum thrust.

ASC 135, cockpit indication of external fuel load, was incorporated in the aircraft. However, as previously stated, the external tanks are used only for water ballast and as such, the tank portion of the ASC was never incorporated because the system would soon be rendered useless due to corrosion.

In the opinion of the Board, there was no violation of NATOPS procedures. A change in procedures is indicated, however, in that, had the pilot visually checked the tanks, this accident would have been prevented. A recommended change in accordance with OPNAVINST 3510.9 is forthcoming.

Personnel taking part in the rescue and salvage operations are to be commended for a job well done.

An HC-2 Helo, on an instrument training hop, was over the scene of the crash within minutes. With the exception of the pilot getting in the sling backwards, no difficulty was experienced in the rescue.

Due to the location of the wreckage, i. e., dense brush, marsh land and distance from the nearest access road, it was impossible for crash equipment to get within 500 feet of the mishap. It was, therefore, anticipated that salvage operations would be a difficult and time consuming operation. There is in fact no question that the actual job of getting the aircraft out of the brush was difficult; however, the NAS Lakehurst salvage team completed the operation in minimum time. See Enclosures (17) and (20).

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Part VIII - Conclusions

The Aircraft Accident Board in its findings determined that the primary cause factors of this accident was pilot error in that he:

(1) Failed to realize, either by preflight or other available information the actual gross weight of the aircraft prior to take-off.

(2) Failed to analyze the situation rapidly enough to jettison the external stores, once committed to take-off.

It cannot be definitely stated whether these factors were an end result of pilot complacency, a case of predetermined and/or preoccupied thought, or any combination thereof. However, in the opinion of the Board, ALL THREE OF THE FOREGOING HUMAN ELEMENTS CONTRIBUTED IN SOME DEGREE to the pilot's actions and reactions.

A contributing cause of the accident was a supervisory factor in that:

(1) The qualified plane captain who preflighted the aircraft was not made available to send the aircraft out. Had he been present, rapport between LT (b) and himself may have established the actual fuel loading of the aircraft.

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Part IX - Recommendations

It is recommended that:

(1) All pilots be constantly reminded of the importance of conducting a conscientious and thorough preflight, i. e., flight planning (including take-off roll), read and study applicable portions of yellow sheet, and perform a thorough visual inspection of the aircraft, etc.

(2) All pilots be continuously reminded of the necessity to mentally prepare themselves for unusual emergency situations.

(3) The plane captain that is responsible for pre-flighting the aircraft be present during the pilot's preflight and call his attention to any external loading. Also, ensure that a cockpit indication is provided.

(4) A change in NATOPS procedures to require the pilot, during preflight, to visually inspect the external stores for presence of liquids.

(5) NAS Lakehurst be provided with crash and rescue vehicles (Army LA...), capable of penetrating the terrain surrounding the Air Station.

(6) The ditch located in the overrun area of Runway 24 be filled in to provide a smooth surface.

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- Enclosure (1)

ORIGINAL

PILOT STATEMENT of AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT, NA4B, BU NO 142685 OCCURRING 31 AUG. 1965

At about 1330 on 31 August 1965, I went out to the West Field NATF(SI) Line to man A-4B, BuNo 142685 for a ferry flight to NAS Patuxent River. The purpose was to take the aircraft to NATC for a current weight and balance. The aircraft was being used in SATS catapult testing and an accurate C. G. and weight were desired.

As this was only a ferry hop, I did not expect the external tanks to be filled with water. No one had mentioned to me that the external tanks would be filled, and normally the tanks are only filled at the Test Facility runway (about one mile away) for test purposes. Since the long 12,000' Test Facility runway was being worked on and was not manned with crash crew or tower personnel, I planned to take off from the 5,000 foot runway at West Field under the impression that the external tanks would be empty. Take-off performance of the A-4 has been one of the primary concerns of the SATS catapult testing that I have conducted for the past three months. I have first hand knowledge from personally flight testing and observing about one-hundred A-4 heavy weight take-offs and am extremely aware of A-4 take-off performance. I am very familiar with take-off distance and airspeed requirements for gross weight and density altitude. Take-offs on the 5,000 foot runway at West Field are normal operations at Lakehurst in an A-4 with empty tanks and I did not anticipate any problem whatsoever. I read past yellow sheets and the aircraft was in good condition with very few maintenance gripes. I did not notice any indication of water in the external tanks and overlooked it if it was there.

I had been informed that the personnel sending me out might not be completely familiar with the A-4 as the NATF(SI) Line crew was being secured early for a picnic. Therefore, on my pre-flight I did not ask any questions of the plane captain as I did not expect him to be too acquainted with that particular aircraft.

During my pre-flight, I rapped the external tanks, but I must have had such a preconceived notion that they would be empty, that the typical thud of a full tank did not register in my mind. I found no discrepancies and manned the aircraft.

Start and post start procedures were normal and the aircraft was ready for flight in every way.

Under the impression that the external tanks were empty, I called for taxi to take-off from the 5,000 foot duty runway at West Field. After completing the take-off checklist and establishing half flaps with four units nose up trim, I called for and received take-off clearance.

I added full throttle, read 100% RPM, 660°EGT, and commenced take-off roll. I did not feel anything abnormal until the last 1,500 feet when I noticed

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OPNAVINST 3750.6E

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ORIGINAL

ENCLOSURE (2)

ORIGINAL

PILOT STATEMENT of AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT, NA4B, BUNO 142685 OCCURRING 31 AUG 1965 cont.

that the nose was not coming up the way it should. I then decided to keep the nose on the runway as long as possible to gain as much speed as I could. At the end of the runway, I rotated to a flying attitude with almost 150 KIAS but the aircraft did not become airborne. I then rotated further as the aircraft went onto the dirt overrun and became airborne simultaneously with a fairly hard jolt as if I had hit something. The airspeed immediately began to drop off and I made a quick attempt to raise the landing gear to reduce drag, but it was obvious I was settling back into the trees. I was airborne an extremely short time, and I was not completely aware yet that my problem was full external tanks rather than a power failure or some other malfunction. I had no chance to observe instruments in the cockpit as the aircraft was very close to stall, and I was trying to see where I was headed. I did not eject because I was holding back pressure on the stick and had I let go, the aircraft would have pitched over nose down into the trees. I pulled the throttle back attempting to shut the engine down about the time the aircraft first hit the trees, and I braced myself with head lowered. The impact was much less than I anticipated, and I was jolted only slightly in the cockpit.

The aircraft came to a stop fairly well intact, and the cockpit area did not appear to have suffered much damage. I opened the canopy by the normal method, unstrapped, and climbed out of the cockpit. I then noticed the engine was still running at idle, so I reached back in and shut off the throttle.

Although I saw no fire or smoke after shutting down the engine, I started making my way through the brush away from the aircraft in case of any explosion. When I got about one-hundred feet away, the rescue helicopter appeared overhead, and I waited for the sling pick-up.

Although this was an abnormal situation to have water in the external tanks, and I received no indication from anyone that it would be such, I could have prevented the accident by making a more thorough pre-flight. The load status of the external tanks is a critical item when taking off from short runways and the pilot should firmly establish whether or not the tanks are full. Rapping the tanks is obviously not an absolute determination. I highly recommend a sight gage or some other simple, quick way of determining tank load status.

I have been TAD to Lakehurst for three months and my hurried desire at a chance to return home may have been a psychological factor in reducing the effectiveness of my pre-flight and preventing indications of full external tanks from registering in a set of circumstances where the tanks were expected to be empty.

I have 1,400 jet hours, was designated a Naval Aviator in February 1959, and

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OPNAVINST 3750.6E

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ORIGINAL

ENCLOSURE (2)

ORIGINAL

PILOT STATEMENT of AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT, NA4B, BUNO 142685 OCCURRING 31 AUG. 1965 cont.

graduated from the Naval Test Pilot School in February 1964. In the last year and a half, I have qualified and conducted flight tests in the F-4, F-8, F-104, A-1, A-3, A-4, C-1 and T-2 aircraft. I have also fanned and received pilot time in the A-5, A-6, E-2, P-2 and T-38 aircraft.

(b) (6)

LIEUTENANT
U. S. NAVY

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OPNAVINST 3750.6E

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ORIGINAL

ENCLOSURE (2)

ORIGINAL

STATEMENT of PLANE CAPTAIN, (b) (6) ADJ3, USN

Tuesday, 31 August 1965, approximately 1220, I was informed that I was to send aircraft A4B, 685 out about 1400. At 1300 I checked the aircraft over on the line. I found that the center and two wing tanks had water in them. I then checked the yellow sheet. It stated that the three 300 gallon drop tanks were full. Approximately 1355, the pilot manned the plane. After light off, I went through the standard A4B signals with the pilot. The pilot gave four degrees nose up trim which checked out. The plane left the line at full flaps. As the plane taxied to the runway it went to approximate half flaps.

Certified to be a true copy

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

ADJ3

USN

Credibility: Excellent

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ORIGINAL

ORIGINAL

EYEWITNESS STATEMENT of CAPTAIN HENRY W. DRUM, USN, COMMANDING OFFICER of THE U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION, LAKEHURST, NEW JERSEY CONCERNING THE AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT OCCURRING 31 AUGUST 1965

On 31 August 1965, at approximately 1410, I was on the aircraft parking apron adjacent to Hangar 307 when I heard a jet aircraft commence its take-off run on Runway 24. The aircraft, an A4 with external fuel tanks, came into my view about halfway down the runway. Slightly past the intersection of Runways 15-33 and 6-24, the pilot apparently rotated the aircraft for take-off. The aircraft in the nose high attitude did not become airborne, and shortly thereafter went off the paved runway, into the over run. A small amount of dust arose in the vicinity. A second or two later the aircraft became airborne trailing light smoke and what appeared to be heavy mist of gasoline or water. The A4 attained an initial altitude of 5 to 10 feet in a nose high attitude and in a slight right turn. The aircraft did not gain altitude, disappeared from view below the trees and crashed. Within minutes an HC-2 helicopter was over the downed A4 picking up the pilot.



HENRY W. DRUM
Captain, U. S. Navy

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ORIGINAL

ORIGINAL

STATEMENT of LT (b) (6) [REDACTED] CONCERNING ACCIDENT OF A4B, BUNO 142685

I was standing at a window on the second deck in the southwest corner of the hangar at West Field, NAS Lakehurst waiting to observe the takeoff of A4B, BUNO 142685. The aircraft first came into view at the access taxiway just east of the GCA Unit, on Runway 24. When the aircraft appeared it was streaming some white spray from the vicinity of both outboard droptanks. The aircraft was rotating to a takeoff attitude as it passed the GCA Unit. The rotation appeared normal in all respects until about 200 feet past the intersection of Runway 6-24 and Runway 33-15. At that point the aircraft began to rotate to a more cocked-up attitude. The aircraft left the end of Runway 24 in what I would estimate to be about a 20 to 25 degree nose high attitude. At the time the aircraft left the runway it was streaming the white spray from both drop tanks very heavily. The aircraft kicked up a very large cloud of dust as it went over the prepared overrun and was partially obscured from my sight. The aircraft left the dusty area and at that time it was in a very nose high attitude (est. over 30 degrees). The aircraft then went through another sandy spot and became airborne in an extremely nose high attitude (est. vicinity of 35 to 45 degrees). The white spray continued after the aircraft became airborne. The aircraft developed some wing rock while airborne and the nose appeared to maintain its extreme nose-high attitude as long as it was in sight. The aircraft then settled out of sight behind a line of trees, still in the very nose high attitude, and with some wing rock still apparent. After the aircraft disappeared from sight no fire was observed, but a small cloud of bluish-colored smoke appeared and then dispersed.

I was designated a Naval Aviator in December 1957 and now have 2,358 pilot hours (2,127 single engine jet) of which 813 hours are in A4-B/C aircraft. I have been an LSO since December 1959.

Certified to be a true copy

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

LT

USNR

(b) (6)

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ORIGINAL

ORIGINAL

CONTROL TOWERS OPERATOR'S STATEMENT REGARDING THE ATTEMPTED TAKE-OFF AND
SUBSEQUENT CRASH OF VJ 42685. PILOT, LT. (b) (6) NAS PATUXENT RIVER,
MARYLAND.

- 1807Z VJ 42685 was cleared for take-off runway 24, winds 24 degrees
at 8 knots. Pilot rogered his clearance.
- 1807Z VJ 42685 had traversed approximately 3,000 feet when I observed
that he appeared to be dumping fuel. At 4,000 feet it appeared
that his nose gear was off the runway in an attempt to become
airborne. From tower observance it appeared that his main gear
remained on the runway until the aircraft left the runway proper,
after which the aircraft was obscured by the dust cloud.
- 1808Z The crash phone was activated at the time it became apparent that
the aircraft would run off the end of the runway. All emergency
equipment responded immediately.
- 1810Z Department 33 (UH 2) was making an ADF approach and offered his
assistance and was immediately dispatched to the scene.
- 1815Z Department 33 reported the pilot was clear of the aircraft, then
picked up the pilot.
- 1820Z Department 33 landed at West Field and transferred the pilot to
the ambulance.

I have been in the Navy three years and have been an aircontrolman two
years, three months. I have worked in the Tower at Lakehurst two years,
three months, and have been a senior controller six months.

(b) (6)

AC3 USN
SECTION LEADER
"A" STAND CONTROLLER


Credibility: Excellent

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ORIGINAL

DISTANCE

IN
FEET























FLIGHT RESUME

- I Primary Flight Training, NAAS Saufley Field:
Sept. 1957 - November 1957
T-34 - 37 Hours.
- II Basic Flight Training, NAAS Whiting Field:
Nov. 1957 - June 1958
T-28 - 122 Hours.
- III Advanced Flight Training, NAAS Kingsville
June 1958 - Feb. 1959
F-9 - 120 Hours.
- IV VAW-11, NAS North Island:
Feb. 1959 - May 1959
F-2H - 5 Hours.
F-9 - 16 Hours.
A-1 - 4 Hours.
- V VF-121, NAS Miramar
May 1959 - Nov. 1959
F-3 - 162 Hours.
- VI VF-92, NAS Alameda/USS RANGER:
Nov. 1959 - Sept. 1960
F-3 - 160 Hours.
- VII VF-121, NAS Miramar
Sept. 1960 - Dec. 1960
F-3 - 23 Hours.
F-10 - 4 Hours.
- VIII VF-114, NAS Miramar/USS Hancock
Dec. 1960 - April 1961
F-3 - 46 Hours.
- IX VF-121, NAS Miramar
April 1961 - Oct. 1961
F-9 - 17 Hours
F-4 - 50 Hours
F-10 - 32 Hours
- X VF-114 NAS Miramar/USS Kitty Hawk
Oct. 1961 - June 1963
F-4 - 282 Hours.

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FLIGHT RESUME cont.

XI USN TPS, NATC, NAS Patuxent River, Maryland.

June 1963 - Feb. 1964

AF-1 - 11 Hours.

F-6 - 6 Hours.

T-1 - 12 Hours.

T-28 - 15 Hours.

S-2 - 26 Hours.

HU-16 - 16 Hours.

F-8 - 5 Hours.

T-38 - 1 Hour.

B-26 - 3 Hours.

XII Flight Test, NATC, NAS Patuxent River, Maryland.

Feb 1964 - Present

F-4 - 124 Hours.

F-8 - 84 Hours.

F-104 - 29 Hours.

A-1 - 43 Hours.

A-3 - 21 Hours.

A-4 - 28 Hours.

A-5 - 1 Hour.

A-6 - 3 Hours.

T-2 - 3 Hours.

T-38 - 1 Hour.

G-1 - 70 Hours.

P-2 - 2 Hours.

E-2 - 3 Hours.

T-28 - 11 Hours.

HU-16 - 2 Hours.

S-2 - 8 Hours.

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ORIGINAL

STATEMENT of LT (b) (6) USN, (b) (6) ASSISTANT AIRCRAFT
MAINTENANCE OFFICER, CONCERNING CRASH OF A-4B, BUNO 142685, WHICH OCCURRED
ON 31 AUGUST 1965.

The Naval Air Test Facility (Ship Installations) accepted A-4B, BUNO 142685, from the Naval Missile Center, Point Mugu on 11 June 1961. At this time this aircraft was in its second service tour with an accumulation of 349 flight hours since Navy acceptance by the Bureau of Naval Weapons Representative, El Segundo, California. The Fourth Progressive Aircraft Rework (PAR) was completed on this aircraft on 6 May 1965 by the U. S. Naval Air Station, Quonset Point, Rhode Island, Overhaul and Repair (O&R) Department. At this time the aircraft was returned to the Naval Air Test Facility, located at the U. S. Naval Air Station, Lakehurst, New Jersey, for service in launching and arrestment project evaluation. The aircraft has accumulated 55 flight hours since completion of the fourth PAR and as of the date of the crash had a total of 816 service life flight hours.

A calendar periodic inspection had not been performed on the aircraft since completion of the Fourth PAR on 6 May 1965, since only 117 days had accumulated. The major inspection interval for the A-4 aircraft is seventeen weeks, (computed to 119 days), as specified by BuWeps Instruction 4700.2A. The aircraft had been scheduled for a periodic calendar inspection to commence on 2 September 1965. The engine, Model J65 W16A, Serial Number 611931, installed in this aircraft had four previous overhauls performed, had a total of 1,234 service life hours, of which 55 hours had accumulated since the last overhaul. This engine was installed in the aircraft during the Fourth PAR, completed on 6 May 1965.

The aircraft had flown 18 catapult/arresting gear project missions from 23 August 1965 until the date of the crash. The duration of such flights is approximately .5 hours. Review of the OPNAV Form 3760-2 (Yellow Sheet) Part "B" (Discrepancy Section) revealed no aircraft or engine discrepancies resulting from the last eighteen flights.

The aircraft was configured with three (3) 300 gallon capacity external fuel tanks. In the interest of economy, water was utilized in the external tanks for ballast purposes to attain maximum aircraft gross weights for catapult launching authorized experimental projects. Following such launchings the water is "dumped" immediately to permit arrestment recovery of normal runway landing within specified gross weight recovery/landing limitations. Dumping the water from the external wing tanks is accomplished automatically by means of an external hose adapted to the top of the tanks at approximately the longitudinal center. By this means a siphoning effect is created, dumping

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ORIGINAL

ORIGINAL
STATEMENT OF LT (b) (6) USN cont.

the water automatically as air speed increases during launching. The water is dumped from the center line external tank by means of an external hose adapted to the fuel transfer flow line. The pilot must select external fuel transfer to dump the water from the center line external tank. The external fuel tank plumbing on this aircraft was completely and in all respects isolated from the aircraft fuel system.

(b) (6)

LT

USN


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22
ORIGINAL

ENCLOSURE (18)

ALL CONFIGURATIONS
WITH AND WITHOUT JATO

ENGINE: J65-W-16A



TAKEOFF DISTANCE


ALL CONFIGURATIONS

HALF FLAPS

NO JATO

ENGINE: J65-W-16A

MODEL: A-4A/B



REMARKS:

1. Takeoff distances are based on engine delivering military thrust.
2. For takeoff over a 50-foot obstacle, read total distance on scale below ground roll distance **J**.

EXAMPLE:

See text.

A4B 142625 REQUIRED 6200 FEET OF RUNWAY
COMPUTED WITH A 5 KNOT HEADWIND COMPONENT

DATA AS OF: 15 March 1963

DATA BASIS: NATC and Contractor Flight Tests

FUEL GRADE: JP-4, JP-5

FUEL DENSITY: 6.5, 6.8 lb/gal

Figure 11-7. Takeoff Distance (Sheet 2)

RESCUE REPORT

OPNAV FORM 3750-13 (3-63) Stock No. 1-0107-001-7230

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750-14

INSTRUCTIONS: SEE REVERSE

OPNAV REPORT SYMBOL 3750-14

1. FROM		2. DATE OF MISHAP		2A. DATE OF RESCUE	
CO, Helicopter Combat Support Squadron TWO (HC-2)		31 Aug 65		31 Aug 65	
3. LOCATION AND DUTIES OF RESCUE VEHICLE		4. RESCUE VEHICLE (Type/model)			
U.S.N.A.S., Lakehurst, New Jersey, East Field		UH-2A			
5. NUMBER OF PERSONNEL		6. RESCUE BACK UP MEANS			
5		Crash Truck			
7. TIME SEQUENCE OF EVENTS (Local Date Time Group)		8. WEATHER CONDITIONS AT RESCUE SITE			
7A. Alert Received Method		8A. WATER TEMPERATURE		AIR TEMPERATURE	
1408 Q Visual Sighting		NA °F		74 °F	
7B. Vehicle Departed Distance to Scene		8B. SEA STATE/WAVE HEIGHT/FREQUENCY; TERRAIN DESCRIPTION			
1408 Q 3 Miles		SWAMP			
7C. Arrived on Scene Search Required		20-30 FOOT SCRUB			
1410 Q None		PINE			
7D. Located Survivor Method of Locating		9. EQUIPMENTS ACTUALLY USED DURING RESCUE			
1410 Q Visual		SLING			
7E. Began Retrieval What Was Sighted First					
1412 Q Orange Tail of A/C					
7F. Ended Retrieval Subsequently					
1415 Q PILOT					
7G. Survivor(s) Location (If different from Item 3)					
1420 Q U.S.N.A.S., Lakehurst West Field					
10. DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED (List all difficulties and effect on final outcome of rescue attempt, i.e., ALERTING PERIOD, SEARCH/LOCATING, RETRIEVING, POST-RETRIEVAL)					
NONE					

11. PERSONNEL REQUIRING RESCUE NAME--LAST FIRST INITIAL	GIVE REASON FOR RESCUE	FACTORS COMPLICATING RESCUE ATTEMPT Physical condition, ignorance of equipment, sea state, etc.
(b) (6)	A/C Crash	Rescues Entered Sling Backward

12. REMARKS: (Training of rescue teams or crews, communication equipments/technique, retrieval equipments/techniques, rescue vehicle)

The performance of the helo rescue crewman was excellent. There were no difficulties encountered. The pilot appeared to be in shock and entered the sling backwards and was picked up the same way. Once in the helo the pilot sat on the deck and was held in by the rescue crewman.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66

13. ATTACH ENCLOSURES: Narratives of search, location and retrieving—Survivor's Statement

14. NAME AND TITLE OF SUBMITTING OFFICIAL

SIGNATURE OF SUBMITTING OFFICIAL

15. NAME AND TITLE OF FORWARDING OFFICIAL

SIGNATURE OF FORWARDING OFFICIAL

PLATE NO. 14735

ENCLOSURE (21)

STATEMENT OF LT (b) (6), USNR, (b) (6)
PILOT OF UH-2A BUONO 150144

At 1335 local I launched from NAS Lakehurst East Field on a routine instrument training flight. LT (b) (6) (under instruction) was in the right seat and I was in the left. We departed the local pattern shortly after 1400. While LT (b) (6) was putting on the "hood" I was climbing to 2,000' on a heading of about 060° and calling West Field tower for clearance for a practice ADF approach. West Field tower cleared me as requested and cautioned me to watch for an A-4 which was taxiing into take off position on runway 24. I saw the A-4 taxiing downwind into take off position and gave the airplane to LT (b) (6) with instructions to make a right turn and proceed direct to "high station". As runway 24 came into sight, I saw a large cloud of dust and debris over the overrun area of runway 24, but the A-4 could not be seen. At this time I took control of the aircraft, started a descent toward West Field, and asked West Field tower if I could be of assistance. I was informed that the A-4 had crashed and that the crash crew was on the way. I then informed the tower that I would check the scene. I had the orange tail of the A-4 in sight at about 1 mile and at about 1/2 mile the pilot was visible in the furrow the A-4 had made on touchdown. The pilot waved and gave a thumbs up as I flew over him. As I started a 360° turn I instructed LT (b) (6) to dump fuel (1600 pounds total) and as we made our approach to a hover to secure the dump valve (1200 pounds total) I entered 20 foot hover but due to leaves and twigs in the rotor wash I increased the hover to 30 feet. This did not help so I returned to 20 feet while the crewman made the pickup. We then took the pilot to the West Field line where he was transferred to an ambulance.

Weather information for this time was:

OAT-74° F, Wind 190/8-14, density altitude +900'

MAX Power required was 97%, there were no difficulties encountered

(b) (6)

"SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66
OPNAVINST 3750.6E

STATEMENT OF LT (b) (6) USNR, (b) (6)
CO-PILOT OF UH-2A BUNO 150144

During a simulated DNT Hop on 31 August 1965, we were practicing ADF approach to West Field Lakemurst when LT (b) (6) spotted dust clouds at the end of the runway. I raised and removed the instrument hood and we flew in the traffic pattern. We spotted the tail of the A-4 and then the pilot in an orange flight suit. We circled wide, dumping fuel and came in for the pickup. Chief (b) (6) lowered the hoist and the pilot was brought aboard. The pilot was taken from a furrowed area of a marsh in which the A-4 crashed. We then took the pilot to the ramp area of West Field.

(b) (6)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66
OPNAVINST 3750.6E

STATEMENT OF LTJO (b) (6) USNR, (b) (6)
PASSENGER IN UH-2A BUONO 150144

On 31 August 1965 LT (b) (6) and LT (b) (6) went out on a routine instrument training flight. At 1407 local time, while commencing an instrument approach to West Field, a clous of dust was noticed off the end of runway 24. Crash trucks were racing down the runway. LT (b) (6) called the tower and offered assistance and the controller dispatched us to the scene.

On arrival we saw the pilot walking away from an A-4. We circled, informing the tower that we were picking him up. We hoisted him in and brought him to West Field where the A-4 pilot was transferred to a waiting ambulance.

(b) (6)

"SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66
OPNAVINST 3750.6E

STATEMENT OF (b) (6) (b) (6) ADJC, USN
CREWMAN OF UH-2A BUHO 150144

I was flying in UH-2A 150144, as an aircrewman and lookout on an instrument hop on 31 August 1965 at 1745 when LT (b) (6) called over the intercom stating that crash trucks were going out in the woods near West Field and asked me if I had a rescue sling in the back of the helo in case it was needed. We called the tower and told them we were in the area and could give assistance if needed. LT (b) (6) and I spotted the tail of the plane at the same time and I spotted the pilot in his orange flight suit walking away from the plane. I informed the pilots of the fact and we flew directly over him and made a 360° turn while dumping fuel, when we came over the pilot of the downed plane for a second time the hoist boom was extended and I hooked up the sling. We were then in a hover over the pilot, so I lowered the sling. He got into the sling and I brought him up and inside the helo. Then LT (b) (6) retracted the hoist boom and we flew over to West Field and landed. The pilot of the downed A/C, LT (b) (6) got out and was met by a Navy doctor, and a line crewman. We then proceed back to Mat #1 and landed.

(b) (6)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66
OPNAVINST 3750.6E

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Commander, HC-2
NAS, Lakehurst

DATE: 1 September 1965

FROM : LT (b) (6)

SUBJECT: Pilot Statement on Helicopter Rescue

1. After my accident in A-4B BuNo. 142685 on 31 Aug 1965, I climbed out of the cockpit and began making my way through the brush away from the airplane. I was about 100 feet away from the airplane and about 3 minutes had passed from the time of accident when the helicopter appeared overhead. I waved at them and gave a thumbs up to indicate that I was not injured. I was in the middle of heavy brush and trees and a helicopter landing was not feasible, so a sling pickup was made.
2. I had removed my torso harness and helmet when the helicopter arrived overhead and at first attempted to wave the helicopter away so that I could put my harness back on to take it with me. I then simply put the harness on only thru the arm openings, put my helmet on and entered the sling. I have had survival training and sling pickups before, but I entered the sling incorrectly thru the front.
3. I was lifted by the sling and had no difficulty entering the helicopter.
4. The helicopter pilot and crew did an outstanding job and I experienced no problems.

Very respectfully,

(b) (6)

LT USN

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66
OPNAVINST 3750.6E

AIRCRAFT FIRE/RESCUE REPORT
NAVWEPS FORM 11135/1 (8-60)
 STATION AND LOCATION

NO TRANSMITTAL LETTER REQUIRED

REPORT SYMBOL BUWEPS 11135-1

U.S. Naval Air Station
Lakehurst, New Jersey

DATE OF REPORT

9-2-65

AIR NO.

1

DATE AND TIME OF INCIDENT

8-31-65

ON STATION

☒

OFF STATION

BUREAU NO.

142685

MODEL AIRCRAFT INVOLVED

A-4-B

REPORTING CUSTODIAN

NATF (SI) NAS Lakehurst, New Jersey

TO: Chief, Bureau of Naval Weapons (SEEQ)

MILITARY COMMAND

VIA **Commandant 4th Naval District**

SIGNATURE

EXACT LOCATION OF INCIDENT

**2000 ft. from end of
 runway 06**

TYPE OF INCIDENT

FIRE INVOLVED

ESTIMATED CASE

TAKE-OFF	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	LINE OR LOADING	FUELING
LANDING		PARKED	MAINTENANCE
TAXIING		DEFUELING	INFLIGHT

YES	
NO	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
IMPACT	
IGNITION	
DELAYED	
IGNITION	

Due to Gross Wt. and Density Altitude.

OTHER (Specify)

CONDITIONS AT TIME OF INCIDENT

GENERAL WEATHER PICTURE

Fair

WIND DIRECTION	S-S-W
WIND VELOCITY (mph)	8-14 Knots
TEMPERATURE (°F)	74

NATURE OF TERRAIN AT AND IN APPROACH TO INCIDENT

Wooded and swampy area.

LIQUID FUEL QUANTITY

ESTIMATED ON BOARD BEFORE INCIDENT (lbs)	810 Gal.
ESTIMATED ON BOARD AFTER INCIDENT (lbs)	220 Gal.
ESTIMATED SPILL AREA (Size in feet)	25 Ft.

OTHER FUELS

Oil- 4.5 Gal.

PERSONNEL RESCUE

NO. PERSONNEL ON BOARD AIRCRAFT	1
NO. PERSONNEL SURVIVED	1
NO. PERSONNEL ESCAPED UNAIDED	1
NO. PERSONNEL RESCUED	

DESCRIBE RESCUE METHODS USED

Unaided.

FIRE FIGHTING

FIRST METHOD OF ALARM USED

TIME RECORD

TWO-WAY RADIO

EMERGENCY INTER-COM.

EMERGENCY PHONE

☒

TIME ALARM RECEIVED

1407

TIME EQUIPMENT ARRIVED

1412

OTHER METHOD (State)

STATION EQUIPMENT

EACH EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE AT INCIDENT		NO. PERSONNEL MANNING EQUIPMENT		QUANTITY EXTINGUISHING AGENTS USED	
TYPE	NO. LOADS USED	MIL.	CIV.	FOAM (gals. conc. used)	OTHER TYPES AND QUANTITIES
MB-1		3	-		
MB-5		2	1		
MB-5		3	-		
MB-5		2	1		
06		3	-		

STATION EQUIPMENT OUT OF SERVICE

TYPE	DEFICIENCY	NO. OF DAYS	EXPLAIN DELAYS TO REPAIR
MB-5	FM Check	1	
Rescue Truck	Brake Drums	4	Delay in obtaining parts.

**SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN
 ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66**

OPNAVINST 3750.6E

**DESCRIPTION OF DIFFICULTIES IN FIRE CONTROL AND
EXTINGUISHMENT DUE TO UNUSUAL CONDITIONS OR EQUIPMENT
AND/OR AGENT INADEQUACIES**

NONE

**RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENTS IN EQUIPMENT
AND/OR PROCEDURES TO INCREASE EFFICIENCY**

NONE

MONETARY LOSSES (Estimated)

PERCENT DAMAGE BY IMPACT		PERCENT DAMAGE BY FIRE		LOSS TO SURROUNDING PROPERTY	
Strike		None		None	
DATE	SIGNATURE				
9-2-65	<div style="background-color: black; color: red; padding: 2px;">(b) (6)</div> Asst. Fire Chief				
DATE	SIGNATURE				
9-2-65	STATION COMMANDING OFFICER <div style="background-color: black; color: red; padding: 2px;">(b) (6)</div> USN, Commanding				

Upon arrival at scene of crash, found A-4 upright in a swampy area 2000 ft. from the approach end of 06 runway, pilot was picked up by a helicopter. Due to terrain, first aid fire extinguishers were taken in to the scene, checked entire plane for fire, there was no fire present, had ejection seat secured.

Remarks: Two NATF men left for fire watch with 3 PKP fire extinguishers, 2 NATF men relieved at 2030 by 1 Marine, watch was maintained until plane was salvaged.

"SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66
OF NAVINST 3750.5E

DISTRICT REPORT NO.

PROPERTY INVOLVED

ACTIVITY (Name and Location)

U.S. Naval Air Station, Lakehurst, N.J.

MGMT. BDR.

8. ACTIVITY CODE

13. DATE OF FIRE

DIST. USE ONLY

KIND OF FIRE

No fire

BLDG. NO. OCCUPANCY AND USE

none Aircraft crash

ACT. REPT. NO.

DIMENSION OF BLDG. (Feet)

LENGTH

WIDTH

HEIGHT

NO. OF STORIES

TOT. FLOOR AREA, ALL FLOORS (Sq. Ft.)

EXTERIOR WALL CONSTR.

FLOOR CONSTRUCTION

INTERIOR FINISH

ROOF CONSTRUCTION

ROOF COVERING

BUILDING PROTECTION

AUTOMATIC SPRINKLERS PROVIDED

☐ NO ☐ YES % COVERAGE

OPERATED AT FIRE

☐ NO ☐ YES

TYPE OF SYSTEM

☐ DRY ☐ WET ☐ DELUGE

CONN. TO F.A. HDQS.

☐ NO ☐ YES

SPRINKLERS EXTINGUISHED FIRE

☐ NO ☐ YES ☐ HELD FIRE IN CHECK

NO. HEADS OPERATED

PERFORMANCE SATISFACTORY

☐ NO ☐ YES

AUTO. FIRE ALARM SYSTEM PROVIDED

☐ NO ☐ YES % COVERAGE

OPERATED AT FIRE

☐ NO ☐ YES

CONNECTED TO FIRE ALARM HDQS.

☐ NO ☐ YES

TYPE OF SYSTEM

☐ FIXED TEMP. ☐ RATE OF RISE ☐ COMB. ☐ OTHER (Describe)

PERFORMANCE SATISFACTORY

☐ NO ☐ YES

MANUAL ALARM SYSTEM PROVIDED

☐ NO ☐ YES

CONNECTED TO FIRE ALARM HDQS.

☐ NO ☐ YES

OPERATED AT FIRE

☐ NO ☐ YES

PERFORMANCE SATISFACTORY

☐ NO ☐ YES

PORTABLE EXTINGUISHERS OPERATED AT FIRE (Describe No. and Type)

OPERATED SATISFACTORY

☐ NO ☐ YES

OTHER SPECIAL EXTINGUISHING SYSTEMS OPERATED AT FIRE (Describe)

OPERATED SATISFACTORY

☐ NO ☐ YES

HISTORY OF FIRE

METHOD OF DETECTION

NOTIFICATION RECEIVED BY

38. TIME OF ALARM

ALARM TRANSMITTAL METHOD

☐ VERBALLY ☐ FIRE ALARM BOX ☐ AUTOMATIC FIRE ALARM

☐ SPRINKLER ALARM

☐ FIRE TELEPHONE

☐ COMM. TELEPHONE

OTHER (Explain)

POINT OF ORIGIN (Describe in detail)

FIRE EXTENDED TO

CAUSE OF FIRE

CONTRIBUTING FACTORS (Defects in design, failure to comply with recommendations)

NO. AND TYPES OF APPARATUS RESPONDING FROM OUTSIDE SOURCES OR OTHER ACTIVITIES

EXTENT TO WHICH OUTSIDE AID WAS EMPLOYED (Apparatus, hoses, personnel, etc.)

NO. AND TYPES OF STATION APPARATUS RESPONDING

METHOD BY WHICH FIRE WAS EXTINGUISHED

TIME FIRE SECURED

DAMAGE TO GOVERNMENT PROPERTY

DAMAGE OTHER THAN GOVERNMENT

ITEM	BUILDING	CONTENTS	OTHER	TOTAL
VALUE	\$	\$	\$	\$
	49	56	63	
DAMAGE	\$	\$	\$	\$

70

NO. OF PERSONS INJURED

NO. OF PERSONS KILLED

AMOUNT OF CONTINGENT LOSS (Explain)

DIRECT	INDIRECT	TOTAL	DIRECT	INDIRECT	TOTAL
71	73		75	76	

"SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66
OPNAVINST 3750.6E
77

PLATE NO. 10278

CONTROL

NO. OF STATION FIREFIGHTERS	CIVILIAN	MILITARY	AUXILIARY	NO. OF HYDRANTS USED	WATER USED (Gals.)	PRESSURE DURING FIRE	NORMAL STATION PRESSURE
ON DUTY	11	0	10	WATER FROM OTHER SOURCES			
ON CALL	15	0	10				
RESPONDING	5	0	0				
HOSE LINES AND NOZZLES				SALVAGE AND OVERHAUL OPERATIONS (Describe briefly)			
SIZE	NO. OF LINES	LENGHT	DIA. NOZZLE TIP				
BOOSTER							
1 1/2"							
2 1/2"							
OTHER							

DELAY IN ALARM TRANSMISSION, RESPONSE, OR DEFICIENCIES IN WATER, ALARM OR OTHER FIRE PROTECTION EQUIPMENT OR SYSTEMS

None

BRIEF STORY OF FIRE (Include all important details, attach sketch of area and operations if applicable. Use additional sheets if necessary.)

At 1410, 31 August 1965, Received call over crash phone from West Field Control Tower of an A4B aircraft crashed in woods off runway # 24. Engine # 3 and Forestry truck dispatched to scene. Asst. Fire Chief responded in radio pickup. Upon arrival found aircraft N48B # 142685 of NATP(SI) about 300 yards south of road leading from runway # 33 to Jet Track #1. Forestry truck proceeded toward aircraft and bogged down in mud about 500' short of aircraft, proceeded on foot with dry powder and TMB extinguishers. Used one 30 # dry powder extinguisher on hot engine, no fire visible. Pilot was removed by helicopter. Aircraft was taking off from runway # 24.

RECOMMENDATIONS (Include action taken to prevent similar occurrences).

(b) (6)

Asst. Fire Chief
Naval Air Station, Lakehurst, N.J.

FIRE DEPT.
REPORT NO.

APPROVED BY
H. W. DRUM, CAPT USN, COMMANDING
Naval Air Station, Lakehurst, N.J.

FIRE DEPT.

PLATE NO. 10276 (BACK)

00

00

North

25

24

Jump
Circle

West

East

West Field
Crash
HeadquartersPerimeter
Road
Swamp

MB-5

C6

33

MB-1

South

MB-5

ME-

Swamp

Forestry
Truck

Wind South South West

Distance From Crash
Headquarters to Crash Scene
1 Mile and 5 Tenths

"SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66
OPNAVINST 3750.6E

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - PAGE 1

OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

OPNAV FORM 3750-8 (REV. 3-63)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED - See OPNAVINST 3750.6E for instructions.

SECTION A - IDENTIFICATION

1. FROM (Name and mailing address of activity) NATF (SI) USNAS, Lakehurst, New Jersey						2. MOR NUMBER 1-65		3. LEAVE BLANK																					
4. TYPE OF MISHAP <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ACCIDENT <input type="checkbox"/> GROUND ACCIDENT <input type="checkbox"/> INCIDENT			5. TIME & ZONE 1407		6. DATE 31 AUG 1965		7. GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION USNAS, Lakehurst, New Jersey																						
8. MODEL A/C ALB		9. BUNO 142685		10. NO. OF OCCUPANTS 01		11. DAMAGE CODE Alpha		12. UNIT OPERATING A/C NATF (SI)																					
13. INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED USE ADDITIONAL SHEETS IF REQUIRED NAME (Last, first and middle initial)			14. UNIT TO WHICH ATTACHED		15. RANK/ RATE		16. FILE/SERV. NO. DESIGNATOR		17. DUTY ASSIGNMENT ABOARD A/C AT MISHAP		18. DATE OF LAST PHYSICAL		19. PHYSICALLY QUALIFIED FOR FLIGHT		20. BRANCH OF SERVICE		21. INJURY CODE		22. DISPO- SITION										
A. (b) (6)			NATC Pautaxent River		LT		(b) (6)		A A		1964 SEPT		Yes		USN		E I		F										
B.																													
C.																													
D.																													
23. CLARIFICATION OF ITEMS 13-22 WHEN NECESSARY N/A																													
24. MODEL-OTHER A/C IF INVOLVED N/A					25. BUNO N/A					26. NO. OF OCCUPANTS N/A					27. UNIT OPERATING A/C N/A					28. DAMAGE CODE N/A					29. MOR NO. N/A				

30. NARRATIVE ACCOUNT OF MISHAP (Use additional 8 x 10 1/2 sheets if required)

See attached sheets

31. PRIMARY CAUSE FACTOR ASSIGNED BY ACCIDENT BOARD

Pilot Error Failure to Preflight aircraft properly

32. CONTRIBUTING CAUSE FACTOR ASSIGNED BY ACCIDENT BOARD

Qualified plane captain who preflighted aircraft was not made available to send the aircraft out.

33. POSSIBLE CAUSE FACTOR ASSIGNED BY ACCIDENT BOARD

N/A

34. HAVE ALL FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, & RECOMMENDATIONS BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO THE A/C ACCIDENT BOARD? IF NO, EXPLAIN.

YES ☒ NO ☐

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 60 OPNAVINST 3750.6E

35. REPORT PREPARATION CHECK LIST

☒ ALL PARTS OF FORM COMPLETED

☒ DRAWINGS SKETCHES, PHOTOS

☒ SURVIVORS NARRATIVES

☒ WITNESS STATEMENTS

☒ CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

☒ REQUIRED COPIES FURNISHED

36. REPORT FILED BY (Name & signature of medical officer)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

LT, MC, USN

DATE

37. FORWARDED (Name & signature of authority)

(b) (6)

CAPTAIN, USN

DATE

9/17/65

347 10-19-65

PILOT STATEMENT of AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT, NA4B, BUONO 142685 OCCURRING 31 AUG. 1965

At about 1330 on 31 August 1965, I went out to the West Field NATF(SI) Line to man A-4B, BuNo 142685 for a ferry flight to NAS Patuxent River. The purpose was to take the aircraft to NATC for a current weight and balance. The aircraft was being used in SATS catapult testing and an accurate C. G. and weight were desired.

As this was only a ferry hop, I did not expect the external tanks to be filled with water. No one had mentioned to me that the external tanks would be filled, and normally the tanks are only filled at the Test Facility runway (about one mile away) for test purposes. Since the long 12,000' Test Facility runway was being worked on and was not manned with crash crew or tower personnel, I planned to take off from the 5,000 foot runway at West Field under the impression that the external tanks would be empty. Take-off performance of the A-4 has been one of the primary concerns of the SATS catapult testing that I have conducted for the past three months. I have first hand knowledge from personally flight testing and observing about one-hundred A-4 heavy weight take-offs and am extremely aware of A-4 take-off performance. I am very familiar with take-off distance and airspeed requirements for gross weight and density altitude. Take-offs on the 5,000 foot runway at West Field are normal operations at Lakehurst in an A-4 with empty tanks, and I did not anticipate any problem whatsoever. I read past yellow sheets and the aircraft was in good condition with very few maintenance gripes. I did not notice any indication of water in the external tanks and overlooked it if it was there.

I had been informed that the personnel sending me out might not be completely familiar with the A-4 as the NATF(SI) Line crew was being secured early for a picnic. Therefore, on my pre-flight I did not ask any questions of the plane captain as I did not expect him to be too acquainted with that particular aircraft.

During my pre-flight, I rapped the external tanks, but I must have had such a preconceived notion that they would be empty, that the typical thud of a full tank did not register in my mind. I found no discrepancies and manned the aircraft.

Start and post start procedures were normal and the aircraft was ready for flight in every way.

Under the impression that the external tanks were empty, I called for taxi to take-off from the 5,000 foot duty runway at West Field. After completing the take-off checklist and establishing half flaps with four units nose up trim, I called for and received take-off clearance.

I added full throttle, read 100% RPM, 660° EGT, and commenced take-off roll. I did not feel anything abnormal until the last 1,500 feet when I noticed

PILOT STATEMENT of AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT, NA4B, BUNO 142685 OCCURRING 31 AUG 1965 cont.

that the nose was not coming up the way it should. I then decided to keep the nose on the runway as long as possible to gain as much speed as I could. At the end of the runway, I rotated to a flying attitude with almost 150 KIAS but the aircraft did not become airborne. I then rotated further as the aircraft went onto the dirt overrun and became airborne simultaneously with a fairly hard jolt as if I had hit something. The airspeed immediately began to drop off and I made a quick attempt to raise the landing gear to reduce drag, but it was obvious I was settling back into the trees. I was airborne an extremely short time, and I was not completely aware yet that my problem was full external tanks rather than a power failure or some other malfunction. I had no chance to observe instruments in the cockpit as the aircraft was very close to stall, and I was trying to see where I was headed. I did not eject because I was holding back pressure on the stick and had I let go, the aircraft would have pitched over nose down into the trees. I pulled the throttle back attempting to shut the engine down about the time the aircraft first hit the trees, and I braced myself with head lowered. The impact was much less than I anticipated, and I was jolted only slightly in the cockpit.

The aircraft came to a stop fairly well intact, and the cockpit area did not appear to have suffered much damage. I opened the canopy by the normal method, unstrapped, and climbed out of the cockpit. I then noticed the engine was still running at idle, so I reached back in and shut off the throttle.

Although I saw no fire or smoke after shutting down the engine, I started making my way through the brush away from the aircraft in case of any explosion. When I got about one-hundred feet away, the rescue helicopter appeared overhead, and I waited for the sling pick-up.

Although this was an abnormal situation to have water in the external tanks, and I received no indication from anyone that it would be such, I could have prevented the accident by making a more thorough pre-flight. The load status of the external tanks is a critical item when taking off from short runways and the pilot should firmly establish whether or not the tanks are full. Rapping the tanks is obviously not an absolute determination. I highly recommend a sight gage or some other simple, quick way of determining tank load status.

I have been TAD to Lakehurst for three months and my hurried desire at a chance to return home may have been a psychological factor in reducing the effectiveness of my pre-flight and preventing indications of full external tanks from registering in a set of circumstances where the tanks were expected to be empty.

I have 1,400 jet hours, was designated a Naval Aviator in February 1959, and

graduated from the Naval Test Pilot School in February 1964. In the last year and a half, I have qualified and conducted flight tests in the F-4, F-8, F-104, A-1, A-3, A-4, C-1 and T-2 aircraft. I have also fanned and received pilot time in the A-5, A-6, E-2, P-2 and T-38 aircraft.

(b) (6)

LIEUTENANT
U. S. NAVY

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66
OPNAVINST 3750.6E

OPNAV FORM 3750-8A (REV. 3-63)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. -- See OP. INST 3750.6E for instructions

SECTION B - FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO OR RELATING TO MISHAP BY PHASE OF MISHAP (List in order in accordance with Section B of inst.)

REMARKS

SECTION C AIR CREW DATA

NOV 1960 Ditching at sea-
F3H Demon

13. NO. HRS. IN A DUTY STATUS LAST 24 HRS.	10 hours
14. DIRECTION FACING AT TIME OF MISHAP	Forward
15. LOCATION AT TIME OF MISHAP	

Cockpit

SECTION D	ANTHROPOMETRIC DATA (Compare with health record)
-----------	--

Diagram illustrating anthropometric measurements for a seated individual. The measurements are labeled as follows:

- A. SITTING HEIGHT
- B. TRUNK HEIGHT
- C. FUNCTIONAL REACH
- D. PUTTOCK - KNEE
- E. LEG LENGTH
- F. SHOULDER WIDTH (BIDELTOID)

Additional labels on the right side of the diagram include:

- AGE
- HEIGHT
- WEIGHT

16. LABORATORY TESTS AND RESULTS

LABORATORY TESTS AND RESULTS						
SPECIMEN		TEST PERFORMED	RESULTS	SPECIMEN	TEST PERFORMED	RESULTS
BLOOD	N/A	1.		TISSUE: (CNS)		
		2.		MUSCLE		
		3.		VISCERA		
URINE	N/A			OTHER:		
G.I. CONTENT	N/A					

17. $\frac{1}{2} \times \frac{1}{2} = \frac{1}{4}$

17. U.S. REGISTRATION			
(b) (6)			
MOR NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
1-65	44B	112685	ID TAGS
NAME OF INDIVIDUAL			
(b) (6)			
OP-05F			

**SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66**

OPNAVINST 3750.6C

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1963

OP-05F

AL
"SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66
OPNAVINST 3750.6C

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1963-05973

OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - PAC

OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

FORM 3750-88 (REV. 3-63)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED — See OPNAVINST 3750.6E for instructions.

ACTION E

INDIVIDUAL CHRONOLOGICAL DATA

SEE PAGE 8 PARA. 10 OF INSTRUCTION
TO BE COMPLETED ON PLANE COMMANDER, PILOT, CO-PILOT, OTHER INDIVIDUAL
IN CONTROL OF AIRCRAFT AT TIME OF MISHAP, AND/OR INDIVIDUAL CAUSING THE MISHAP

USE LOCAL TIME AND BRIEFLY RECORD ACTIVITY WITHIN EACH COLUMN

48 HOURS PRIOR TO MISHAP

29 AUG 65

1200 Lunch
1400 Left to play 6 holes
of golf
1600 Returned from golf
1700 Supper
1730 Went to hospital to
feed new baby
1830 Returned home watched
T.V.
2200 Went to bed Slept

30 AUG 65

0645 Up for breakfast
0800 Went to work
0830 Left in T-28 for
Columbus, Ohio
1030 Arrived Columbus, Ohio
1200 Lunch
1300 Flew NPE hop on T-28
for 1 hour
1700 Left Columbus in T-28
for Pax Riv
1845 Arrived Pax Riv
2000 Supper
2200 Went to bed

31 AUG 65

0715 Up for breakfast (2
fried eggs on toast
1 glass of milk)
0800 Went to work
1100 Left for Lakehurst in
F-8
1130 Arrive NAS Lakehurst
1230 Lunch (ham sandwich
and Vanilla milkshake)
1400 Attempted take off
from Lakehurst

TIME

ACCIDENT
PHASE31 AUG 65
1407

Crash landed about $\frac{1}{2}$
mile off end of runway
24

ESCAPE PHASE

31 AUG 65
1408

Manually opened canopy
unstrapped self and
walked away from
aircraft
Picked up by Helo ✓
(horse collar hoist)
50 yards from plane
Taken to westfield
NAS Lakehurst

SURVIVAL
PHASE

TIME OF RESCUE

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN

ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66

OPNAVINST 3750.6E

MOR NO.

1-65

MODEL A/C

A4B

BUNO

142685

IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL

ID TAGS

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL

(b) (6)

OP-05F

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1963-685975

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - PAC

OPNAV FORM 3750-8C (REV. 3-63)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED - See OPNAVINST 3750.6E for instructions.

OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

SECTION F

PATHOLOGICAL DATA

(Refer to Section F of instructions.)

1. INJURY CODE AND DISPOSITION

G I

2. PRE-EXISTING PHYSICAL DEFECTS

None
(b) (6)

3. UNCONSCIOUSNESS

☒ NO ☐ YES DURATION:

4. DROWNED
N/A

5. ASPHYXIATED
N/A

6. SHOCK
☐ MILD ☐ MODERATE ☐ SEVERE

7. EXPOSURE
☐ MILD ☐ MODERATE ☐ SEVERE

8. EXTENT OF CARBONIZATION
N/A

9. IF ADMITTED TO SICK LIST, GIVE DIAGNOSIS
Not admitted

10. PLACE OF HOSPITALIZATION
N/A

11. GROUNDED? IF YES, GIVE REASON

☒ NO ☐ YES

12. DURATION (See instruction)
N/A

13. PRIMARY CAUSE OF DEATH

N/A

14. SECONDARY CAUSE OF DEATH

N/A

15. AUTOPSY CONDUCTED BY:

☐ PATHOLOGIST, MEDICAL OFFICER PRESENT ☐ PATHOLOGIST, MEDICAL OFFICER NOT PRESENT

☐ MEDICAL OFFICER

16.

☐ PROTOCOL ATTACHED ☐ WILL BE FORWARDED

17. WAS "AUTOPSY MANUAL, NAVMED P5065" USED?

☐ YES ☐ NO

N/A

18. IF NO AUTOPSY CONDUCTED, GIVE REASON

Alive

19. INJURIES

PHASE SUSTAINED

CAUSE AND MECHANISM (If unknown, theorize)

1. (b) (6)

X

(b) (6)

2.

X

20. REMARKS

At moment of impact pilot tucked head
(chin on chest)

MOR NO. 1-65	MODEL A/C A4B	BUNO 142685	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL ID TAG	SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 65 OPNAVINST 3750.6E
NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (b) (6)				☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1963 85972

OP-05P

SECTION F (Continued)

SURFACE INJURIES

DESCRIBE AND SHOW GRAPHICALLY BY OUTLINING AND SHADING AFFECTED AREAS
ALL LACERATIONS, ABRASIONS, CONTUSIONS, PUNCTURE WOUNDS, SPRAINS AND BURNS

RECORD ALL INJURIES NO MATTER HOW TRIVIAL, WHETHER PATIENT LIVED OR DIED

(b) (6)

DETAILS OF SKULL FRACTURES AND BRAIN INJURY. DESCRIBE AND SHOW GRAPHICALLY.

1. ALL FRACTURES, BY TYPE (Simple, depressed, or indirect, etc.) 2. SITES OF BRAIN LESIONS, IF ANY. 3. DISLOCATIONS OF MANDIBLE.

N/A



"SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66
OPNAVINST 3750.6E

MOR NO. 1-65	MODEL A/C A4B	BUNG 112685	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL ID TAGS
-----------------	------------------	----------------	---

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL

(b) (6)

OP-05F

SECTION G ESCAPE, PERSONAL AND SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT

LIST AND CODE IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION G OF INSTRUCTION:

PHASE CODES: A-ACCIDENT/MISHAP E-ESCAPE/EGRESS PHASE
 S-SURVIVAL R-RESCUE PHASE

1. EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION INCLUDING SPECIFIC MODEL DESIGNATION	2. MODIFICATION	3. RE-REQUIRED	4. AVAILABLE	5. NEED	6. USED	7. FAILED	8. REMARKS (Explain failures, loss, and/or difficulty encountered. Use additional 8x10 1/2 plain paper if needed.)
Inertia Reel and harness straps #3815-37	None	Yes	A	A	A	N/A	This device held pilot firmly in seat at moment of impact as designed to do

SECTION H

NARRATIVE OF ESCAPE/EGRESS, SURVIVAL AND RESCUE PHASES

Pilot manually turned canopy control handle, opened the canopy, and climbed out. He then walked about 100 feet away from the downed aircraft. At this point a helicopter was directly overhead. He waved to the helo and gave them a "thumbs up". The helo circled and then lowered a horse collar hoist to the pilot. Pilot climbed into hoist backwards and was brought into helo. Taken by helo to NAS Lakehurst West field and met by Station Flight Surgeon.

MOR NO. 1-65	MODEL A/C A4B	BUNO 112685	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL ID TAGS
NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (b) (6)			

"SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66
 OPNAVINST 3750.6E

OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - PAGE 6
 SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. See OPNAV INST 3750.6E for instructions

OPNAV FORM 3750-86 (REV. 3-63)

SECTION I

DETAILS OF ESCAPE/EGRESS/SURVIVAL PHASES REFER TO SECTION I OF INSTRUCTIONS

1. TOPOGRAPHY OF INDIVIDUAL'S LANDING SITE

☐ WATER ☒ LAND ☐ OTHER Aircraft came to rest in low scrub pines in swamp

2. TYPE OF EGRESS

☐ EJECTION ☐ BAILOUT ☐ UNDERWATER ☐ NORMAL ☒ OTHER (State type)

S	E	REMARKS	
N/A	3. NOT ATTEMPTED	Opened canopy manually by turning manual canopy control handle, and climbed out	
	4. ATTEMPTED		
	5. ACCOMPLISHED		
	6. THRU CANOPY		
YES	NO	EGRESS DIFFICULTIES	IF YES, EXPLAIN DIFFICULTIES
N/A	7. PRIOR TO EGRESS		
	8. DURING EGRESS		
	9. SUBSEQUENT TO EGRESS		

10. GIVE TYPE AND MODEL OF EJECTION SEAT USED

11. METHOD OF FIRING SEAT

☐ PRIMARY ☐ SECONDARY ☐ OTHER

12. SEQUENCE OF EJECTION

13. POSITION OF SEAT ON EJECTION

☐ UP ☐ DOWN ☐ FORWARD ☐ AFT ☐ OTHER

14. ATTITUDE OR MANEUVER OF A/C AT EXIT

on ground

15. AIRSPEED

stopped

16. ALTITUDE AT TIME OF EXIT (FEET)

on ground

17. ALTITUDE OF PARACHUTE OPENING

N/A

18. WEIGHT

N/A

19. TIME IN WATER

N/A

20. TIME IN RAFT

N/A

21. WIND VELOCITY

N/A

22. WAVE HEIGHT

N/A

23. WAVE INTERVAL

N/A

24. AIR TEMPERATURE

74° F

25. WATER TEMPERATURE

N/A

26. VISIBILITY

15 miles

27. ALERTING FACTORS

NAS Lakehurst tower

30.

N/A

31.

thick underbrush

32.

clothing

33.

N/A

34.

N/A

35.

N/A

36. DID INDIVIDUAL DEPART FROM LANDING SITE?

(If Yes, Explain reason and sequence up to rescue)

☐ NO ☒ YES

walked about 100 feet away to be clear of any possible explosion.

TRAINING FACTORS

SECTION J

1. DATE OF LAST TRAINING

LPC SEPT 1964

EJECTION TOWER

SEPT 1964

EJECTION SEAT

SEPT 1964

SURVIVAL

SEPT 1964

2. DID THE LACK OF TRAINING AND/OR EXPERIENCE PLAY A PART IN ANY PHASE OF THIS MISHAP? (If yes, explain)

☒ NO ☐ YES

MOR NO.

1-65

MODEL A/C

ALB

BUNO

142685

IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL

ID TAGS

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66 OPNAVINST 3750.6E

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL

(b) (6)

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(b) (6), (b) (5)

(b) (5)

The error which led to his accident was the result of a psychological phenomena. Prior to manning the aircraft, LT (b) (6) mind was prejudiced to the point of believing that the external tanks were empty. All of the environmental stimuli such as the yellow sheet, percussion of the tanks during preflight, and the heavy feeling of the aircraft during taxi were subliminal for the threshold he had established. Consequently his cerebral neurons did not respond, no action was taken, and the accident developed. Immediately after the accident, the reason was apparent to him. He had a supra threshold stimulus. (b) (5)

For lack of a more precise description, we label this complacency. We can only try to prevent this, by preaching the fact that it can occur, and requiring an alert, questioning, and trouble free state of mind in any aviator about to man an aircraft.

The fact that LT (b) (6) tucked his head at the moment of impact, and then suffered (b) (6)

(b) (6) may be a point worth noting. The forces of deceleration of his head were distributed along the superior-inferior axis of the cervical spine, resulting in negligible injury.

(b) (6)

LT, MG, USN

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 6C
OPNAVINST 3750.6E

STATEMENT of LT (b) (6) CONCERNING ACCIDENT OF A4B, BUNO 142685

I was standing at a window on the second deck in the southwest corner of the hangar at West Field, NAS Lakehurst waiting to observe the takeoff of A4B, BUNO 142685. The aircraft first came into view at the access taxiway just east of the GCA Unit, on Runway 24. When the aircraft appeared it was streaming some white spray from the vicinity of both outboard droptanks. The aircraft was rotating to a takeoff attitude as it passed the GCA Unit. The rotation appeared normal in all respects until about 200 feet past the intersection of Runway 6-24 and Runway 33-15. At that point the aircraft began to rotate to a more cocked-up attitude. The aircraft left the end of Runway 24 in what I would estimate to be about a 20 to 25 degree nose high attitude. At the time the aircraft left the runway it was streaming the white spray from both drop tanks very heavily. The aircraft kicked up a very large cloud of dust as it went over the prepared overrun and was partially obscured from my sight. The aircraft left the dusty area and at that time it was in a very nose high attitude (est. over 30 degrees). The aircraft then went through another sandy spot and became airborne in an extremely nose high attitude (est. vicinity of 35 to 45 degrees). The white spray continued after the aircraft became airborne. The aircraft developed some wing rock while airborne and the nose appeared to maintain its extreme nose-high attitude as long as it was in sight. The aircraft then settled out of sight behind a line of trees, still in the very nose high attitude, and with some wing rock still apparent. After the aircraft disappeared from sight no fire was observed, but a small cloud of bluish-colored smoke appeared and then dispersed.

I was designated a Naval Aviator in December 1957 and now have 2,358 pilot hours (2,127 single engine jet) of which 813 hours are in A4-B/C aircraft. I have been an LSO since December 1959.

(b) (6)

LT USNR
623079/1315

"SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66, OPNAVINST 3750.6E".

EYEWITNESS STATEMENT of CAPTAIN HENRY W. DRUM, USN, COMMANDING OFFICER of
THE U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION, LAKEHURST, NEW JERSEY CONCERNING THE AIRCRAFT
ACCIDENT OCCURRING 31 AUGUST 1965

On 31 August 1965, at approximately 1410, I was on the aircraft parking apron adjacent to Hangar 307 when I heard a jet aircraft commence its take-off run on Runway 24. The aircraft, an A4 with external fuel tanks, came into my view about halfway down the runway. Slightly past the intersection of Runways 15-33 and 6-24, the pilot apparently rotated the aircraft for take-off. The aircraft in the nose high attitude did not become airborne, and shortly thereafter went off the paved runway, into the over run. A small amount of dust arose in the vicinity. A second or two later the aircraft became airborne trailing light smoke and what appeared to be heavy mist of gasoline or water. The A4 attained an initial altitude of 5 to 10 feet in a nose high attitude and in a slight right turn. The aircraft did not gain altitude, disappeared from view below the trees and crashed. Within minutes an HC-2 helicopter was over the downed A4 picking up the pilot.

HENRY W. DRUM
Captain, U. S. Navy

"SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66, OPNAVINST 3750.6E".

STATEMENT of PLANE CAPTAIN, [REDACTED]

(b) (6)

ADJ3, USN

Tuesday, 31 August 1965, approximately 1220, I was informed that I was to send aircraft A4B, 685 out about 1400. At 1300 I checked the aircraft over on the line. I found that the center and two wing tanks had water in them. I then checked the yellow sheet. It stated that the three 300 gallon drop tanks were full. Approximately 1355, the pilot manned the plane. After light off, I went through the standard A4B signals with the pilot. The pilot gave four degrees nose up trim which checked out. The plane left the line at full flaps. As the plane taxied to the runway it went to approximate half flaps.

(b) (6)

ADJ3

USN

Credibility: Excellent

"SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66, OPNAVINST 3750.6E"

CONTROL TOWERS OPERATOR'S STATEMENT REGARDING THE ATTEMPTED TAKE-OFF AND
SUBSEQUENT CRASH OF VJ 42685. PILOT, LT. (b) (6), NAS PATUXENT RIVER,
MARYLAND.

- 1807Z VJ 42685 was cleared for take-off runway 24, winds 240 degrees
at 8 knots. Pilot rogered his clearance.
- 1807Z VJ 42685 had traversed approximately 3,000 feet when I observed
that he appeared to be dumping fuel. At 4,000 feet it appeared
that his nose gear was off the runway in an attempt to become
airborne. From tower observance it appeared that his main gear
remained on the runway until the aircraft left the runway proper,
after which the aircraft was obscured by the dust cloud.
- 1808Z The crash phone was activated at the time it became apparent that
the aircraft would run off the end of the runway. All emergency
equipment responded immediately.
- 1810Z Department 33 (UH 2) was making an ADF approach and offered his
assistance and was immediately dispatched to the scene.
- 1815Z Department 33 reported the pilot was clear of the aircraft, then
picked up the pilot.
- 1820Z Department 33 landed at West Field and transferred the pilot to
the ambulance.

I have been in the Navy three years and have been an aircontrolman two
years, three months. I have worked in the Tower at Lakehurst two years,
three months, and have been a senior controller six months.

(b) (6)

AC3 USN
SECTION LEADER
"A" STAND CONTROLLER

Credibility: Excellent

"SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66, OPNAVINST 3750.6E".

NNNN
SAFECEN DE COMM NR 008/002

DGA730XRA276
PP RUCKDG
DE RUEGFE 524 2441940
NY EEEEE
P R 011939Z
FM NAVAIRTESTFACSHIPINSTAL LAKEHURST
TO RUECW/CNO

RUCKDG/NAVAVNSAFECEN
INFO RUECM/BUWFS
RUEGFC/COMFOUR
RUCKDP/BUWFSFLTREADREPLANT
RUCKPA/NAVAIRTESTCEN
RUMHBK/BUWFSREP EL SEGUNDO
RUCKSL/JTJG/CARAIWING FOUR
RUWDK/YAGQ/CARAIWING ONE TWO
RUCKID/CGFMFLANT
RUHPT/CGFMTPAC
RUCKHC/CINCLANTFLT
RUHLHL/CINCPACFLT
RUECM/CHNAVMA
ZEN/NAS LAKEHURST
BT

UNCLAS E F T O
SUPPLEMENTARY MSG RPT OF A/C ACCIDENT (SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
IN ACCORD REF A)

A. OPNAVINST P3750.6E

B. MY 312118Z AUG

1. NA4B, 142685, NATC (SI), AAR 1-65, PILOT (b) (6)
2. X-COUNTRY, NAS LAKEHURST TO NAS PAX RIVER, VFR, 0.0.
3. ACFT RECEIVED STRIKE DAMAGE
4. NORMAL TAKE OFF RUNWAY 24 NAS LAKEHURST
5. ACFT ATTEMPTED NORMAL TAKE OFF ON RUNWAY 24 (5,000 FT USEABLE

PAGE TWO RUEGFE 524 UNCLAS E F T O
RUNWAY). DUE TO GROSS WT AND DENSITY ALTITUDE CONDITIONS, ACFT
UNABLE TO OBTAIN LIFT OFF SPEED PRIOR REACHING UP WIND END.
SUSPECT PILOT ATTEMPTED TO PULL ACFT OFF AND IN DOING SO BECAME
AIRBORNE SHORTLY AFTER LEAVING RUNWAY LIP. ACFT CONTINUED IN A
NOSE HIGH ATTITUDE ACROSS TWO ROADS, A FENCE, AND A DITCH BEFORE
CRASHING IN SWAMPY AREA APPROXIMATELY 2,000 FT FROM END OF RUNWAY.
6. ACTUAL WX OBSERVATION 1812Z. 4500 SCAT 9000 SCAT UNKNOWN BROKEN
VIS 15, WIND 190T 8 GUST 14, TEMP 74.0 F, DEW PT 40.3F, ALT 30.20.
7. NONE
8. NO.
9. NO.
10. NO EJECTION ATTEMPT MADE. PILOT EXITED ACFT UNASSISTED.
HELO PICKUP FROM SWAMP.
11. NONE.
12. ACFT GROSS WT WAS APPROXIMATELY 22,100 LBS. THIS INCLUDED
6500 LBS. OF WATER BEING CARRIED IN EXTERNAL TANKS.
BT

A4B/142685 NATC PAX AAR 9-31-65

011939Z

NNNN

SAF CEN DE COMM NR 013/1

TTDCA392XRA667

PP RUCKDG

DEKLRUEGFE 489 2432119

ZNR UUUUU

P 312118Z

FM NAVAIRTES TFACSHIPINSTAL LAKEHURST

TO RUECM/CNO

RUCKDG/NAVAVNSAFECEN

INFO RUECM/BUWEP

RUEGFC/COMF0UR

RUCKPA/NAVAVNSTECEN

RUCKDP/BUWEPSTLTREADREPLANT

RUCKSL/JTJG/CW FOUR

RWDAX/YAGQ/CW ONE TWO

RWDFFD/CG AIRFM PAC

RUCKHD/CG FMFLANT

RUCKHC/CINCLANTFLT

RUHLHL/CINCPACFLT

RUECM/CNM

BT

UNCLAS

PRELIMINARY MSG RPT OF A/C ACCIDENT

1. OPNAVINST 3750.6E

2. A4B, 142685, NATC (SI)

3. 311807Z, NAS LAKEHURST

4. X-COUNTRY FOR A/C WEIGHING (1K1)

5. ALFA

6. A/C RAN OFF UPWIND END OF RUNWAY ON TAKEOFF. SUSPECT A/C OVER
GROSS WEIGHT FOR RUNWAY LENGTH UNDER DENSITY ALTITUDE CONDITIONS.

7. (b) (6) LT, (b) (6) USN, 1310, ACTIVE, NATC NAS PAX

PAGE TWO RUEGFE 489 UNCLAS

RIVER, NO INJURY

7. NONE

8. NA

9. NO EJECTION ATTEMPT MADE

BT

A4B 142685 NATC PAX AAR

8-31-65

31 2118Z/AJ2

#13/1165

AAR